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Abstract 
 
This paper develops a political economy model to analyze the direct and indirect effects of aid volatility on growth and the 
outcome of higher institutional quality on the effect of aid volatility on growth. Using time-series cross section data for 77 
countries from 1984-2007, the effects of aid volatility on growth are empirically tested. It is concluded that the relationship 
between growth aid volatility is significantly negative and dependent on the level of institutional quality. The results are robust to 
additional covariates, alternate sub-samples, non-linearities, different period averages and various computations of aid volatility. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Generally speaking, the rationale for foreign aid programs is that the provision of aid is beneficial to less developed countries 
(LDCs) because, among other things, it facilitates their economic growth and is thus welfare-improving. A substantial body of 
empirical literature systematically scrutinizing the link between aid provision and LDCs’ economic growth rates now exists (e.g., 
Chatterjee and Turnovsky, 2007; Hansen and Tarp, 2000; Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Durbarry, Gemmell, and Greenaway, 1998; 
Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001; Lensink and White, 2001; Dalgaard et al., 2004; Guillaumont and Chauvet, 2001; Collier and Dehn, 
2001). This wide-ranging body of literature has increased our understanding of donor allocation decisions, how aid affects LDCs’ 
output, and the associated transmission mechanisms.   
 
Most studies of foreign aid have attended to the question of whether aid facilitates or hinders economic growth in LDCs. 
Contradictory empirical answers to this question has more recently led to a focus on volatility in the disbursal of foreign aid and 
its impact on economic growth. Although research on aid volatility is a valuable advance on previous work, there has been scant 
attention paid to another potentially important factor that may affect an aid-recipient’s output: the interactions between the 
potentially corrupt distributional behavior of a recipient government and institutional quality of the environment in which it 
operates.  
 
This paper develops a formal model of foreign aid output-effects which integrates aid volatility, a recipient government’s 
decision-making, and the quality of the institutional environment in which the government is embedded. Our model suggests that 
an aid-recipient government operating in a lower quality institutional environment is less constrained in its propensity to use aid 
for self-consumption (‘corrupt’ expenditure), while a government facing a higher quality institutional environment is more 
constrained in diverting aid to self-consumption. This model entails a finding consistent with most empirical aid volatility-output 
studies, namely, that for a given level of institutional quality, an increase in aid volatility is detrimental to the country’s output 
(Fielding & Mavrotas, 2006; Lensink & Morrissey, 2000; Hudson & Mosley, 2008; Neandis & Varvarigos, 2007; Bulir & 
Hamann, 2008; Arellano et. al, 2009).  
 
As an advance, our model shows that if institutional quality increases as aid volatility is increasing, the overall effect on output of 
the former depends on (a) relative changes in magnitude of a ‘prudence effect’ and a ‘transparency effect’ (The prudence effect is 
a direct effect of aid volatility on the government’s decision to increase public and private capital while the transparency effect is 
the response of the government to a decrease in the institutional quality it is constrained by). (b) the direction of the transparency 
effect and (c) the relative magnitudes of increasing marginal benefits to the government and households of consumption.  
 
In the empirical section of the paper, we test the following hypotheses arising out of the theoretical model: (i) Does aid volatility 
negatively affect economic growth when subjected to various computations of aid volatility? (ii) Does higher institutional quality 
faced by aid-recipient governments offset the total effect of aid volatility on growth?  
 
2. Overview of literature on the effect of aid and volatility 
 
Early theories of underdevelopment saw foreign aid as a means of escaping national poverty. For example, Nelson’s (1956) 
Poverty Trap model held that a number of factors ranging from high populations, low savings rates and low tax bases resulted in 
self-reinforcing poverty and underdevelopment. Nelson suggested that a large exogenous injection of foreign aid could ‘pump 
prime’ economic growth. Chenery and Strout’s (1966) Two Gap theory identified inadequate domestic savings and foreign 
exchange earnings as binding constraints on domestic LDC investment which curtailed potential growth. For them, foreign aid 
could play a key role in closing the savings or trade gaps, thereby stimulating growth and increasing future productive capacity. 
Both models still have currency today (e.g., Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Easterly, 1999, 2001; Chatterjee and Turnovsky, 2007; 
Kraay and Raddatz, 2007; Agenor and Aizenman, 2010). 
  
Empirical studies of the relationship between foreign aid and economic growth has produced contradictory results. On one hand, 
some studies have found often suggested that aid had either negligible or negative effects on growth (e.g. Griffin, 1970; Griffin 
and Enos, 1970; Voivodas, 1973; Mosley, 1980; Dowling and Hiemenz, 1982; Mosley, Hudson and Horrell, 1987; Boone, 1994; 
Easterly, 1999, 2001; Kanbur, 2000). Mosley, et.al. (1987) acknowledged that some particular aid projects had been successful, 
however, suggesting a “micro-macro paradox”. To explain the ineffectiveness of aid, some suggest, following Bauer (1972, 
1991), that the problem lies with the resource allocation distortions due to aid or corrupt aid-recipient governments (e.g. Boone, 
1994; Kanbur, 2000). 
  
On the other hand, the above findings have been contested on a variety of methodological and empirical grounds, often resulting 
in the converse finding that there is a positive relationship between aid and economic growth (e.g. Papanek, 1973; Dowling and 
Hiemenz, 1983; Singh, 1985; Levy, 1988; Durbarry, Gemmell and Greenaway, 1998; Stern, 2002; Stiglitz, 2002; Clemens, 
Radelet and Bhavnani, 2004). A variety of reasons have been offered for the positive findings. These include that aid augments 
savings and enables the financing of private and public investment, and that aid increases productivity by improving health and 
education services as well as proving technology transfer. It has also been found that the positive relationship between aid and 
growth is contingent upon macroeconomic stability and policy effects (e.g. Fischer, 1991, 1993; Easterly, 1993;  Hadjimichael, 
Ghura, Muhleisen, Nord and Ucer, 1995; Bleaney, 1996; Burnside and Dollar, 1997). In summary, these studies found that in the 
presence of stable inflation, conservative fiscal policy and financial liberalization, foreign aid was positively related to private 
investment and economic growth – at least up to a threshold aid/GDP ratio (Hadjimichael et.al., 1995). Durbarry, Gemmell, and 
Greenaway (1998) also found that, conditional on a stable macroeconomic policy regime in LDCs that were not exceedingly 
poor, aid had a positive impact on economic growth within lower and upper aid/GDP thresholds. They also noted that since aid 
was ineffective where aid/GDP was relatively low and in very poor LDCs, this may account for the negative findings of previous 
studies.  
 More recently, another factor thought to negatively impact on the effectiveness of aid is volatility in aid disbursements by donors 
(e.g. Lensink and Morrissey 2000; Pallage and Robe, 2001; Bulíř and Hamann, 2003, 2008; Bulíř and Lane, 2004; Fielding and 
Mavrotas 2006; Neandis and Varvarigos 2007; Bulíř and Hamann 2008, Hudson and Mosely, 2008; Arellano, Bulíř, Lane and 
Lipschitz, 2009). This literature generally finds that aid volatility has a negative impact on the effectiveness of aid in stimulating 
economic growth (however, see Chauvet and Guillaumont, 2004, 2009). Although this work represents a significant advance in 
our understanding of aid effectiveness, it tends to ignore the potential importance of the choices made by corrupt aid-recipient 
governments and the quality of the institutional environment in which those governments function. Selected examples from the 
literature that demonstrate this is the case follow. 
Although Lensink and Morrissey’s (2000) attribute an implicit role for the aid-recipient government, their conclusion – that aid 
volatility impacts growth negatively due to fiscal uncertainty – is fails to account for the different types of government behavior 
in the face of aid volatility. For example, it may be that volatile aid flows are irrelevant to unaccountable corrupt governments 
uninterested in the productive channeling of aid money. Indeed, it may be conjectured that faced with higher the volatility, 
unaccountable governments can more easily conceal corrupt unproductive expenditure than more accountable governments faced 
with the same volatility. Similarly, in seeking to show that the effect of aid volatility is a more important explanation of growth 
outcomes than the allocation of aid between productive and non-productive uses per se, Neanidis and Varvarigos (2007) ignore 
the possible role of different institutional environments in accounting for government behavior. This is partly because they 
implicitly assume that aid-funded government expenditure will always be productive. If, however, we instead posit an 
unaccountable corrupt government, then we can contemplate aid-funded government expenditure that is not used for productive 
purposes. Further, we could also posit differential distributive behavior by governments in the face of volatile aid disbursements. 
Augmenting previous work, Hudson and Mosley (2008) find that although the initial impact of both ‘upside’ (above trend) and 
‘downside’ (below trend) aid shocks are detrimental to economic growth, some of the negative impact is subsequently reversed 
in the case of ‘upside’ shocks. As with Lensink and Morrissey (2000), however, Hudson and Mosley implicitly assume that aid-
recipient governments seek to maximize economic growth. This need not be the case. The degree to which a government is 
corrupt combined with the quality of the accountability institutions it faces may vary, and thus may have variable effects on the 
way a government distributes aid in the face of ‘upside’ and ‘downside’ shocks, which in turn could impact on national output. 
Using an intertemporal two-sector general equilibrium model, Arellano, et.al. (2009) find that welfare-enhancing, even in the 
face of a declining traded goods sector and little effect on investment, because it is used mainly for private consumption. 
However, for LDCs with little access to international capital for consumption smoothing, aid shocks result in welfare-
diminishing consumption volatility. Thus eliminating aid volatility and government disbursal of aid in a manner that insured 
against macro-shocks would be highly welfare-enhancing. This prescription again implicitly assumes, however, that the recipient 
government is not corrupt and/or faces strong accountability institutions which would ensure a welfare enhancing disbursal of 
aid. 
 It should be noted, however, that discussion of the institutional environment that aid-recipient governments face is certainly not 
absent from the aid literature (e.g. Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Collier and Dollar, 2002; Lahiri and Michaelowa, 2006; 
McGillivray, Feeny, Hermes and Lensink, 2006; Epstein and Gang, 2009). With respect to the issue of aid volatility, although 
less conspicuous, aid-recipient institutional quality has also not been ignored. For example, Fielding and Mavrotas (2006) 
speculate that weaker policy environments hinder aid absorption, where aid volatility is induced by weak institutions. 
Consequently, they hypothesize that higher institutional quality is associated with reduced aid volatility, with the underlying 
explanation being that recipients with higher institutional quality may be better able to maintain ‘good working relationships’ 
with donors. Their empirical results however, do not confirm this hypothesis: higher institutional quality is not necessarily 
associated with less aid volatility. This is one of the few empirical investigations of aid volatility that incorporates institutional 
quality. It will be noted however, that Fielding and Mavrotas only seek to examine the behavior of the donor with respect to the 
aid recipient’s institutions. They do not seek to examine the possible subsequent effect on economic output of how the 
institutional environment shapes the aid-allocative behavior of recipient governments.  
 
To bridge the gap between the findings of empirical studies which conclude that aid volatility has negative growth effects and 
those empirical studies which find strong institutions to have growth enhancing effects, Kathavate & Mallik (2012) formalized a 
simple political economy mechanism to delineate how aid volatility negatively impacts growth and how its impact is mitigated 
with better quality institutions.  As such, it was the first paper of its kind (as far as I know) in the area of foreign aid volatility 
which formalized the political economy mechanism linking aid volatility to growth and the strength of institutions to aid 
volatility and output, and which  empirically confirmed both phenomenon to a host of robustness tests. Utilizing the theoretical 
framework of Kathavate & Mallik (2012) in this paper I formalize aid volatility to have two types of effects on growth: i) an 
indirect effect of aid volatility on growth (termed the "transparency effect") and ii) a direct effect (termed "the prudence effect"). 
Both effects are shown to be tempered by higher institutional quality. Empirically, we test the total effect of aid volatility on 
growth and the mitigating impact that higher quality institutions have on this, subject to a variety of sensitivity tests which were 
lacking in Kathavate & Mallik (2012).  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 presents the model of government choice and shows how the 
negative effect of aid volatility on output is mitigated by rises in the level of institutional quality. In Section 4, we motivate our 
empirical analysis by characterizing the empirical strategy and data. Section 5 discusses the empirical evidence for 77 countries 
from a period of 1984-2007, supporting the main results of the model, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
3. A Simple Model 
The government receives foreign aid which it allocates for public infrastructure,  k , and income transfers to households (or 
transfers, for short), T . It is assumed that both of these expenditures are exclusively financed by aid donations. Output is 
determined by 
1( , )Y Y k K k K   , where K  and k are private infrastructure and public infrastructure, respectively, and   is 
the elasticity of output with respect to public infrastructure. The amount of aid received by the aid-recipient government is 
denoted by A .The amount of income that remains after the government has allocated for public infrastructure and transfers 
is A k T  . Households apportion a part of the income transfer they receive into private infrastructure. The fraction of income 
transfers the households allocate to private infrastructure is denoted by  . Thus, the amount of private investment allocated by 
households can be represented by K T , where 0 1  . Further, it is assumed that the economy’s output is subject to the 
following relationships: , 0k KY Y   
and , 0kk KKY Y  . 
 
 Aid receipts are conceptualized as follows. Donations are stochastic such that
0
0
( )
(1 )( )
p x x
A
p x x
 
  
  
, where p  is the probability 
of receiving ‘high’ aid and (1 )p  the probability of receiving ‘low’ aid. 0x  
is the amount of officially promised aid, and x  acts 
as a measure of volatility. Without loss of generality let 1/ 2p  , which we denote by p .  
 
 
The government consumes the amount A k T   and obtains utility ( )u A k T  , where u  is an increasing and concave utility 
function. The third derivative of the government’s utility function is assumed to be positive ( 0u  ). That is, the government is 
assumed to be a prudent agent (see Kimball 1990). The amount, A k T  , is treated as representing self-consumption, or in 
other words, corrupt expenditure.
1
 If the government invests k  and makes income transfers to individuals of magnitude T , then 
the expected payoff from self-consumption is: 
   0 0[ ( )] ( ) (1 ) ( )h hE u A k T p u x x k T p u x x k T          
 
This expected payoff assumes that the magnitude of public infrastructure and income transfers is less than the amount of aid 
received. Since aid is the only source of income, public infrastructure and income transfers cannot be greater than the amount of 
aid. Specifically, we assume A k T  . We also assume that 0x x . This ensures that, first, the expected payoff is not left 
indeterminate, since 0x x  implies the right hand side of the expected payoff, particularly  0(1 ) ( )hp u x x k T    , 
becomes  (1 ) ( )hp u k T   , and second, aid receipts are non-negative. 
 
The government however, faces a trade-off between maximizing expected utility from consumption and decreasing its 
probability of being removed from office by the citizenry. It is assumed that the government can improve its chances of staying 
in office by increasing the nation-state’s output and thereby improving the citizenry’s welfare. (Note that for simplicity it is 
assumed throughout that population growth is zero, so we can speak of output rather than output per capita.) It is further 
stipulated that the government possesses a specific propensity for engaging in corrupt behavior (i.e. self-consumption). This is 
denoted by  . This propensity weights the trade-off between self-consumption and citizenry utility.  
 
The government’s propensity to engage in corrupt behavior is assumed to be negatively related to the nation-state’s institutional 
quality – the latter being defined as the strength of ‘checks and balances’ on government decision-making such as corruption 
commissions, freedom and independence of the press, freedom and independence of universities, independence and impartiality 
of the judicial system, democratic accountability, clear property rights and so on. The government’s propensity for corruption, 
                                                          
1
 Corrupt behaviour is characterized by bribery, vote-buying, bolstering public servant salaries, pork barrelling, corrupt campaign financing, etc. 
 , is a function of  institutional quality, z . The parameter z  is determined by cultural, political, psychological factors, which are 
exogenous to the model. We denote ( )z  , where ( ) 0, ( ) 0z zzz z   .   
 
Note that the government is modeled as a maximizing agent conceptually separate from but affected by the institutional 
environment in which it operates. Institutional quality is a cost to the incumbent government in that a higher level of institutional 
quality increases the chances of it losing office, and thus places a high opportunity cost of self-consumption expenditure.  
 
Changes in the level of institutional quality affect the magnitude of the parameter . The larger is z  the larger is the constraint 
on the government to use aid for self-consumption. It is assumed that with more rigorous institutional oversight, a government’s 
probability of loosing office rises, which therefore decreases the government’s propensity to engage in self-consumption. On the 
other hand, the lower is z , the lower is the constraint on a government’s self-consumption. Such weaker institutional oversight 
reduces the government’s probability of loosing office, which in turn raises the government’s propensity for self-corruption. Note 
that in situations of lower levels of institutional quality the incumbent government may be able to remain in office through 
corrupt means, such as bribery, rigging elections, military intervention, etc. – and by virtue of the fact that the general public will 
not be fully aware of the extent of the government’s corrupt activities.  
 
It is further assumed that higher aid volatility generates more uncertainty for institutions in predicting the level of aid money 
going to the government. This increased uncertainty makes it more difficult for the nation-state’s institutions to detect and 
monitor the government’s activities (e.g. corruption commissions are less able to accurately monitor government finances). Work 
by Kangoye (2011) seems to allude to this interaction. Thus, z  is reduced due to increased uncertainty in corruption-detection, 
and hence, the level of institutional quality is lowered. This has the effect of increasing the government’s propensity for 
corruption. 
 
The government cares in part about its own consumption and in part for citizens’ welfare. To the degree that the government is 
incorrupt, denoted by 1 ( )z , it derives utility from productive expenditure directed towards the citizenry’s welfare. To the 
degree that the government is corrupt, denoted by ( )z , it derives utility from self-consumption. The parameter 
1 ( )z represents the government’s ‘level of benevolence’.  
 
Indeed, a self-interested government derives utility from its citizens’ welfare in so far as it believes that increasing citizens’ 
utility increases its own chances of incumbency. The parameter1 ( )z  thus serves as a weight for the importance that the 
government attaches to the degree to which their incumbency chances depend on citizens’ welfare. The greater the aid-recipient’s 
institutional quality, the higher is the government’s subjective probability estimate of losing office, and hence the greater 
(smaller) is the weight the government will attribute to its citizens’ welfare (own expected utility). Conversely, the lower the 
institutional quality, the lower is the government’s probability of losing office, and hence the smaller (greater) is the weight the 
government will attribute to its citizens’ welfare (own expected utility).  
 
 
The government must solve the following problem: 
     
       
       
,
0 0
,
0 0
,
max{ 1 ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) } (1)
max{ 1 ( ) ( , ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) }
max{ 1 ( ) ( , ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) } (2)
p
k T
p
k T
p
k T
z u Y k z E u A k T
z u Y k T T z p u x x k T p u x x k T
z u Y k T T z p u x x k T p u x x k T
  
   
   
     
                
               
 
 
where  ( , ) (1 )pu Y k T T   is the utility of the citizenry and is a function of household consumption, which is increasing in 
output, ( ,Y k T  and in the fraction of transfers which are consumed, (1 )T .) It is assumed that the citizens’ utility function is 
concave in all arguments. The expected utility function for the government’s self consumption is given by [ ( )]E u A k T  . 
(Note: 
pu is the utility of the citizenry, while u is the utility of the government.) Also, 0 ( ) 1z   is interpreted as the 
propensity for government engaging in self-consumption. The propensity for corruption, ( )z , weighs the trade-off between the 
welfare of the people and the government’s self-consumption. The closer ( )z  is to 1, the greater is the government’s 
propensity for self-consumption and conversely, the closer ( )z  is to 0, the smaller is the government’s propensity for self-
consumption. It is assumed that the utility gained by the government through increasing citizenry utility is greater than the 
disutility experienced by the government from decreasing self-consumption in order to facilitate the increase in citizenry utility. 
This assumption is premised on the notion that the government wishes to enjoy future self-consumption, which requires it to 
retain office, and hence, one unit of increase in public capital expenditure generates greater utility through the citizenry utility 
function than disutility through its self-consumption function (i.e. pk ku u )   
 
The first-order condition for the government’s problem reveals that the optimal choices of k and T , satisfy the following first 
order conditions (optimized variables being asterisked): 
 
   
   
* *
* *
0 0
1 ( ) ( , ) ( , ) (1 )
( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) (3)
p
k k
k k
z Y k T u Y k T T
z p u x x k T p u x x k T
   

    
          
 
 
     
   
* * *
* *
0 0
1 ( ) ( , ) (1 ) ( , ) (1 )
( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) (4)
p
T T
T T
z Y k T u Y k T T
z p u x x k T p u x x k T
     

      
          
 
 
Re-arranging (3)  and (4) we obtain,  
 
 
   
* *
* *
0 0
( , ) ( , ) (1 )( )
(5)
1 ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
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k k
Y k T u Y k T Tz
z p u x x k T p u x x k T
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
   
          
 
    
 
   
   
* * *
* *
0 0
( , ) (1 ) ( , ) (1 )( )
(6)
1 ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
p
T T
T T
Y k T u Y k T Tz
z p u x x k T p u x x k T
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
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The L.H.S of equation (5)  is a proxy for the propensity for government self-consumption (since the L.H.S is increasing 
in ( )z ). Thus, equation (5)  expresses the propensity of government self-consumption as an implicit function of the marginal 
utility functions of the government with respect to capital for ‘high’ and ‘low’ levels of foreign aid and the marginal utility of the 
citizenry with respect to capital public infrastructure. Equation (6)  expresses the propensity of government self-consumption as 
an implicit function of the marginal utility functions of the government with respect to income transfers for ‘high’ and ‘low’ 
foreign aid and the marginal utility of the citizenry with respect to income transfers.  
 
Proposition 1 
P1: As aid volatility ( x ) increases, the government’s optimal public infrastructure ( *k ) and optimal transfer payments ( *T ) 
decrease. 
 
Proof:  
Taking the total differential of public infrastructure with respect to aid volatility, x , yields: 
 
* *
*
* * *
k k
dk dx dz
x z
dk k k dz
dx x z dx
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For equation (3) using the implicit function theorem, the partial derivative of optimal public infrastructure with respect to aid 
volatility
*k
x


, is: 
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where, 
*
0
H
kC x x k T    and
*
0
L
kC x x k T    ; C  represents consumption which remains post allocation of optimal 
public infrastructure expenditure;  the superscripts refer to ‘low’ aid ( L ) and ‘high’ aid ( H ) while the subscripts denote the 
implicitly differentiated variable with respect to volatility. 
 
  
 
For equation (2) , using the implicit function theorem, the partial derivative of optimal public infrastructure with respect to the 
nation-state’s institutional quality, 
*k
z


, is: 
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where ( )z z is the derivative of the government’s inherent level of corruption with respect to the institutional quality 
 
The total derivative for optimal public infrastructure with respect to aid volatility is:  
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   represents the second derivative of the government’s utility function with respect to  optimal 
public infrastructure as institutional quality increases. 
 
 
Similarly, taking the total differential of transfers with respect to aid volatility, x , yields: 
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For equation (4) using the implicit function theorem, the partial derivative of optimal income transfers with respect to aid 
volatility
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x


, is: 
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 where, 
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0
L
TC x x k T    ; C  represents consumption which remains post allocation of optimal 
income transfers expenditure;  the superscripts refer to ‘low’ aid ( L ) and ‘high’ aid ( H ) while the subscripts denote the 
implicitly differentiated variable with respect to volatility. 
 
 
For equation (4) , using the implicit function theorem, the partial derivative of income transfers with respect to the nation-state’s 
institutional quality 
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, is: 
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where ( )z z is the derivative of the government’s inherent level of corruption with respect to the institutional quality 
 
The total derivative for optimal income transfers with respect to aid volatility is: 
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derivative of the government’s utility function with respect to optimal income transfers as aid volatility increases, while 
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     represents the second derivative of the government’s utility function with respect to 
optimal transfers as institutional quality increases.
  
 
 
Assuming a prudent government, i.e. ( ) ( ), ( ) ( )H L H Lkk k kk k TT T TT Tu C u C u C u C   , given the concavity of the government’s utility,  
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and noting that , 0x xk T    , we can conclude that the left hand side of equations (7) and (8) is negative.  
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 
 
Intuition: Higher aid volatility implies greater variation (amplitude) in potential aid donations, and thus increased uncertainty 
regarding aid receipts. Given the nation-state’s level of institutional quality, the government reacts to higher aid volatility by 
increasing its stock of savings by diverting some aid money from public investment/transfers in order to smooth its consumption 
expenditure in the future. The stock of savings is conceptualized as a part of future consumption expenditure or delayed 
consumption expenditure. This reaction by the government to a rise in the aid volatility is termed the ‘prudence effect’.  
 
Further, higher aid volatility makes it more difficult for a nation-state’s institutions to detect the government’s corrupt practices 
than otherwise would be the case (in other words, higher aid volatility makes it is easier for the government to conceal its corrupt 
activities). Thus, increases in aid volatility are followed by decreases in the institutional quality, which impel increases in the 
government’s propensity for self-consumption. Increases in the propensity for corruption, drive down the optimal level of 
infrastructure and income transfer expenditure.  This reaction of the government is termed the ‘transparency effect’. 
 
It is assumed that the government needs to remain in office in order to consume aid money for itself. Though a trade-off between 
self-consumption and productive consumption (i.e. infrastructure for the sake of the citizenry) exists, by increasing self-
consumption expenditure and scaling down infrastructure expenditure, the government does not necessarily harm its chances of 
reelection. The reason is as follows i) Firstly, the government’s scaling down of infrastructure expenditure seems consistent to 
the citizenry with the expected behavior of a government under conditions of aid volatility; For the citizenry, the expected 
behavior of a government when faced with increasing aid volatility is as follows: with respect to public infrastructure, since 
higher aid volatility implies greater variation of potential aid donations (and hence increased uncertainty of aid), the citizenry 
finds it reasonable to expect a government facing aid volatility to moderate its public infrastructure so that small scale projects 
can be completed in a given (high aid) period, or if aid in a following period is low, the smaller scale projects can continue or be 
completed. This is to be contrasted with the alternative: if, in the face of high aid volatility, a government persisted with larger 
long-term public infrastructure plans, this would render the infrastructure of large scale projects taking on a ‘start-stop’ character, 
which would be unpopular. Furthermore, assuming private and public infrastructure complementarities, a government would 
moderate public infrastructure so as to not indirectly generate volatility for private infrastructure, which would be partly 
dependent on the completion of public infrastructure projects. With respect to income transfers, since higher aid volatility implies 
greater variation of potential aid donations (and thus more income uncertainty), it would be reasonable to expect a government 
facing aid volatility to moderate its income transfers in such a way that uncertainty for private spending and infrastructure is 
minimized. 
 
Proposition 2 
P2: The overall effect on optimal public infrastructure and optimal transfers of an increase in the institutional quality combined 
with an increase in aid volatility is partly conditioned by the government’s relative increases in diminishing marginal utility of its 
self-consumption versus citizenry utility: 
 
i) If the following inequalities hold: * * * *
p
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u u , then the negative impact of aid volatility on 
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*
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increases.  
 
ii) If the following inequalities hold: 
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* * * *
p
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u u ,  then whether the negative impact of aid volatility on optimal public capital 
infrastructure (
*
xk ) and optimal income transfers (
*
xT ) is exacerbated or offset as institutional quality increases 
is contingent on the direction of the transparency effect as well as the relative magnitudes of the prudence and 
transparency effects.  
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Equation (9) can be re-written as: 
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Differentiating with respect to the institutional quality z , we obtain:  
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In order to establish interpretable propositions, it is necessary to transform the above inequality. For this purpose, we can re-write 
equation (3)  as follows: 
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From the total derivative equation for optimal public infrastructure, we let
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xz kk  , and   * /z kzk dz dx  , where subscript 
k denotes the impact of increase in the nation-state’s institutional quality on the prudence and transparency effects respectively at 
the level of optimal public infrastructure.  We thus classify the effect of an increase in institutional quality on  * /dk dx into two 
cases: 
 
Case 1: For * * * *
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Performing similar calculations for optimal transfers yields two cases: 
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where the subscript T  denotes the impact of increase in the nation-state’s institutional quality on prudence and transparency 
effects at the level of optimal public infrastructure. 
 
 
In the discussion of proposition 1 we conjectured that given the institutional quality of the nation-state, an increase in aid 
volatility impels the government to raise its level of savings (i.e. its delayed consumption expenditure). For proposition 2, we 
conjecture that when increased aid volatility is combined with increased institutional quality, the government decreases its stock 
of savings. This is because greater institutional quality provides a lesser opportunity for a corrupt government to further 
misappropriate aid. In an environment in which greater checks and balances exist on the government’s activities, potential 
misappropriated aid is now redirected to public infrastructure. As a consequence, the negative marginal effect of a rise in aid 
volatility on optimal infrastructure and optimal transfers is offset as institutional quality increases.  
 
The overall effect on optimal public infrastructure and income transfers, however, of an increase in the institutional quality 
depends on whether  * * * *
p
k k k k
u u and * * * *
p
T T T T
u u , the direction of the transparency effect (denoted above by the following 
possibilities, 0k
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) , and its relative magnitude with respect to the prudence effect (denoted above by the following 
possibilities, ,k k k k      , ,T T T T     ).   
 
The rationale for * * * *
p
k k k k
u u  , * * * *
p
T T T T
u u  is as follows. If the government faces an increase in the institutional quality, this 
change in conditions gives rise to its re-evaluation of its public infrastructure and transfers expenditure. It is posited here that this 
re-evaluation is based on a ‘benchmark’ – viz. a comparison by the government of its increasing marginal benefits relative to the 
decreasing marginal benefits of households. The government’s rule for the inequality in case 1 (the inequality in case 2) is: for 
any increase in public infrastructure/transfers, whenever the magnitude of decreases in the households' marginal utility are 
smaller than or equal to (greater) its own magnitude of increases in its marginal disutility, the government increases public 
infrastructure to a greater (smaller) degree at the margin, than in the case where its magnitude of increasing marginal disutility 
were smaller than the magnitude of decreasing marginal utility experienced by households. This rule is based on the premise that 
the government is less (more) confident about its incumbency chances at the margin, since the threat of losing office is perceived 
to be higher (lower). Thus, the government feels incentivized at the margin to increase public infrastructure and transfers to 
greater (smaller) degrees in the belief that such a decision will enable them to retain office and enjoy future self-consumption.  
 
The overall effect on optimal public infrastructure and optimal transfers in the first case is positive. The overall effect on optimal 
public infrastructure and optimal transfers in the second case depends on the direction of change in the transparency effect and 
the relative magnitude of the transparency effect in comparison to the prudence effect. If the response of the transparency effect 
is negative, then the negative impact of aid volatility on public infrastructure and transfers is offset if and only if the magnitude 
of the prudence effect is greater than the magnitude of the transparency effect. If the response of the transparency effect is in the 
positive direction, then the impact of aid volatility on public infrastructure and transfers is unconditionally offset. 
 
 
Proposition 3 
Given propositions 1 and 2, output (Y ) is negatively related to volatility ( x ).  
 
Proof:  
 Recall the assumptions of the model , 0k KY Y  , which denote that output is increasing (decreasing) as public investment 
and private investment increases (decreases). 
Noting that optimal private investment is a function of income transfers,
* *K T , the result of proposition 1, namely 
*
0
dT
dx
 , implies 
*
0
dK
dx
 . 
Thus we conclude that optimal output is negatively related to aid volatility 
*
0
dY
dx
 , via its negative impact on optimal 
public and private investment.   
 
 
The explanation for this relationship is now well established in the literature. 
Proposition 4 
The overall effect on output of an increase in the institutional quality combined with an increase in aid volatility is partly 
conditioned by the government’s relative increases in diminishing marginal utility of its self-consumption versus 
citizenry utility: * * * *
p
k k k k
u u  and * * * *
p
T T T T
u u . 
 
i) If the following inequalities hold: * * * *
p
k k k k
u u , * * * *
p
k k k k
u u , then the negative impact of aid volatility on 
output is offset as institutional quality increases.  
 
ii) If the following inequalities hold: * * * *
p
k k k k
u u  ,
 
* * * *
p
T T T T
u u ,  then whether the negative impact of aid 
volatility on output is exacerbated or offset as institutional quality increases is contingent on the direction of the 
transparency effect as well as the relative magnitudes of the prudence and transparency effects.  
 
 
Proof:  
 
Proof of the 2
nd
 order mixed partial derivative inequalities was given above (see proof for proposition 2.)  
 
Case 1: * * * *
p
k k k k
u u , * * * *
p
T T T T
u u  
Since 
*
0
dk
z dx



and noting that since
* *K T , 
*
0
dT
z dx



implies 
*
0
dK
z dx



, 0
dY
z dx



 follows from the assumption 
, 0k KY Y  .  
 Thus we conclude that the effect of a rise in institutional quality on the negative marginal impact of aid volatility on optimal 
output is offset via its mitigatory effect on optimal public and private investment, 
*
0
dY
z dx



. 
  
 
Case 2: * * * *
p
k k k k
u u  ,
 
* * * *
p
T T T T
u u  
  
Since the overall impact of aid volatility on optimal public investment and income transfers is given by the following set of 
inequalities: 
 
 *
0 for 0,
0 for 0,
0 for 0
k k k
k k k
k
dk dx
z


     
  
     
  
   
 
 *
0 for 0,
0 for 0,
0 for 0
T T T
T T T
T
dT dx
z


     
  
     
  
   
, where the latter sets of inequalities  
 
imply that the effect of aid volatility on optimal public investment is shaped by the following combinations of outcome: 
 
 *
0 for 0,
0 for 0,
0 for 0
K K K
K K K
K
dK dx
z


     
  
     
  
   
.  
 
Based on the assumption, , 0k KY Y  , the effect of an increase in institutional quality on the impact of aid volatility on optimal 
output follows the following sets of inequalities: 
 
 *
0 for 0,
0 for 0,
0 for 0
Y Y Y
Y Y Y
Y
dY dx
z


     
  
     
  
   
, where the subscript Y  denotes the impact of increase in the nation-state’s 
institutional quality on prudence and transparency effects at the level of optimal public investment.   
 
 
 
Proposition 4 is an implication of the formal combination of the previously demonstrated propositions. Thus, the explanations of 
the previous propositions mutatis mutandis apply.  
 
4. Empirical Strategy and Data: 
 
We utilize panel data which covers 77 countries over the period of 1984-2007. To test our propositions outlined in the theoretical 
section, we employ the following model: 
 
1 2 3
1
( ) (15)
k
irt r t irt irt irt irt j irt irt
j
y z v z v X      

         
  
where irty is average annual growth per capital GDP in country i in region r averaged over 2t   years to t
2
,  r is a regional 
dummy variable for four regions of the world, which controls for regional fixed effects, t  is a variable capturing time varying 
shocks, irtz is a measure of the nation-state’s institutional quality in country i in region r averaged over 2t   years to t , irtv is a 
measure of aid volatility in country i in region r averaged over 2t   years to t , ( )irt irtz v is a measure of the interaction 
between a nation-state’s institutional quality and aid volatility in country i in region r averaged over 2t   years to t  and irtX  is a 
vector of various control variables.  
 
Taking the derivative of the equation above with respect to volatility yields the following point estimate: 2 3 irtz  . Our analysis 
focuses on the coefficients, 2 and 3 . Our theoretical section suggests that 2 should be significantly negative and 3 should be 
significantly positive. This implies that irtz has a threshold below which the effect of aid volatility on growth is negative and 
above which the effect is positive. 
 
Data on institutional is collected from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database
34
. Institutional quality is 
constructed as a composite measure of democratic accountability, institutional corruption and political rights. The ICRG measure 
of democratic accountability measures the degree to which the nation-state’s institutions: i) are accountable to the public; iii) 
have the ability to conduct free and fair elections for the legislature; iii) consist of an independent judiciary; iv) maintain 
protection of personal liberties through constitutional or other legal guarantees. The ICRG measure of institutional corruption 
measures the actual or potential corruption present in the political system by gauging excessive patronage, nepotism, job 
reservations, 'favor-for-favors', secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and business. Political rights 
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 The dependent variable in our study is average annual growth per capital GDP. Real GDP per capita is used to compute an annualized average growth rate according to 
  21/ 2 ln( ) ln( )t ty y  . Though it is standard practice in cross-country growth regressions to utilize 5 year lags, since our study comprises of 21 observations per group, using 5 
year lags to compute the growth rate would lead to observation loss of 3 per group. Thus, we use 2 year lags for computing the growth rate in order to maximize the number of 
observations present for regression analyses. 
3
 The ICRG dataset was kindly provided by Sambit Bhattacharyya, the Senior lecturer at the Research School of Pacific & Asian Studies, ANU.  
4
 This study uses political risk measures from the ICRG database. The measurement of political risk, unlike economic risk, is based on subjective staff analysis based on 
available information. ICRG editors assign points to each category of political risk based on pre-set questions, which ensures subjective consistency over time. The ICRG system 
was adjusted in late 1997 to reflect the change in the institutional environment as a result of the ending of the Cold War. This structural adjustment did not retroactively change 
the political risk variables. This ensures the variables used in the construction of a quality index retain consistency.   
measures the degree of freedom in the voting process and the degree of fair competition of a variety of interest groups.. The 
measurement of political rights is characterized by voting autonomy for minority groups, political competition, and political 
recourse for all citizens. All measures are between zero and seven where zero is representative of a low degree of accountability, 
corruption and political rights, and a measure of seven is indicative of a high degree of accountability, corruption and political 
rights. This composite measure of institutional quality is suitable to our study for the following reasons: i) it is best-suited to 
capture the notion of institutional quality z , expressed in the theoretical section of this paper; ii) since it is an ordinal measure, it 
enables the interpretation of different degrees of institutional quality; iii) Since it covers the time period of our study, 1984-2007, 
and utilizes the most number of observations relative to other measures of institutional quality. This enables us to take advantage 
of panel regression analysis and helps avoid the problem of sample selection bias both across groups and over time; iv) ICRG 
data are widely used in the literature on cross country growth regressions.   
 
Bulir and Hamann (2003) note that due to insufficient data cross country studies do not employ sector-specific aid flows, but 
rather a composite/aggregated measure of aid. Those studies which have employed sector specific analysis of aid flows retain 
largely inconclusive results
5
. Therefore, our computation of aid volatility and aid per capita do not utilize sector-specific aid but 
rather, aggregated aid data gathered from the OECD database for net official development assistance.   
Net official development assistance is a measure of a country’s gross disbursements less its loan repayments. Real aid data was 
computed by deflating the aid series using an implicit GDP deflator (2005 = 100). A real per capita measure was computed by 
adjusting the real aid data series with an absolute measure of the size of population. The measure of total population was 
collected from WDI. Real aid per capita is a more useful measure than absolute real aid or real aid as a proportion to GDP 
because it takes into account the magnitude of aid a country is receiving relative to its size. The measure of absolute aid may 
overstate the magnitude of total aid for larger countries (i.e. with higher populations) and may understate them for smaller 
countries (with smaller populations). Thus, the magnitude of aid should be computed with respect to the size of the aid receiving 
country. Aid as a proportion to GDP may also prove problematic. Suppose there are two aid recipients, A and B, with identical 
GDP at time t . If we assume A grows faster than B, then A has a smaller GDP at 1t  relative to B. Given both recipients receive 
the same amount of aid, this implies that aid as a proportion to GDP is larger for A at 1t  . For country A, we interpret a higher 
correlation between aid and GDP –i.e. higher aid is necessarily results in higher output. This is, however, spurious. The 
difference in growth rate of GDP is driving the result. Even if we assume that each country receives different amounts of aid, it is 
hard to separate the effect of aid on output because of the interaction of different growth rates influencing the denominator 
in Aid/Gdp .  
 
We apply the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter to de-trend a logged real aid per capita. The HP filter splits the aid series into a growth 
or trend component ( tg ) and a cyclical or noise component ( t ). We compute aid volatility by taking the standard deviation over 
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A study by Clemens, Radelet and Bhavani (2004) is an exception.  
3 year time periods of t
6
. Averaged over the sample period, Kyrgyz Republic has the lowest aid volatility of 0.006 with an 
average value of 0.285 while Bahrain has the highest aid volatility of 2.954 with an average value of 0.931.  
 
We use the aid volatility measure computed through the HP filter due to the following advantages: i) the filter has been used 
widely in macroeconomics, specifically business cycle analysis, and thus its methodological approach and properties are widely 
understood and accepted; ii) its filtering process is founded on the assumption that a macroeconomic series is composed of a 
trend and cyclical component; iii) it produces a difference between the actual and trend series that is stationary and it enables the 
trend component to follow a stochastic process (Yap 2003); iv) it has been widely used in aid-growth regressions (such as Bulir 
& Hamann 2003; Arellano et. al 2009; Hudson & Mosley 2008) which render the results of these studies comparable.  
 
Inflation, financial development and balance of payments are often used macroeconomic policy variables in cross country 
regression studies. According to Fischer (1993) inflation is the best indicator of macroeconomic policy environment as it reflects 
the ability of the government to manage the economy. Low and stable levels of inflation, spur growth for given levels of 
investment (Durbarry et al., 1998), while higher and more volatile episodes of inflation lead to the dilution of relative price 
signals through price volatility (Clemens 2010). Inflation has been found to be significant and negatively related to growth in 
several studies. In this study we utilize Log (1+inflation) to capture the level of inflation in the economy. Financial development 
or financial liberalization is also incorporated as a standard control variable in conventional aid-regression studies. Higher 
financial development stimulates economic growth through the expansion and improvement in the efficacy of the nation’s 
financial institutions, such as greater mobilization of savings and increased risk management services, which leads to greater 
investment expenditure (Clemens 2010). We incorporate this variable in our regressions by measuring M2/GDP, which studies 
use as a proxy for financial development.  
  
For simplicity and exposition we construct a macroeconomic policy index combining inflation and financial development. We 
normalize both variables using the following transformation formula: 
x x
s

, where x  is the observation, x is the sample mean 
and s  is the sample standard deviation. We weigh inflation and financial development according to each variable’s correlation 
with growth. This is performed by OLS regression.  
 
Additional control variables we utilize are investment and log of initial GDP per capita, along with various additional covariates.  
                                                          
6 The filter identifies the cyclical component of aid, aidt tA g (via locating a
aid
tg ) from the minimization trade-off by the extent to which the aid growth component keeps a 
track of the original aid series, given a prescribed value for the lack of smoothness of the growth component. (Ahumada & Garegnani 1999).  
As   approaches 0, the prescribed penalty is absent and the growth component is equivalent to the original aid series. In this case, the cyclical component is zero. 
As approaches infinity, on the other hand, the growth component diverges from the original aid series and as a result the cyclical component approaches a linear trend. 
 
Two issues that need to be dealt with in our estimation are potential correlation between aid volatility and institutional 
quality and omitted variable bias. We find that the correlation coefficient between irtz and irtv is -0.078. The magnitude of this 
correlation is not large enough to cause multi-collinearity issues. We handle the issue of omitted variable bias by controlling for 
unobserved region and specific heterogeneity, time-varying characteristics (e.g. shocks), additional controls, which are expected 
to impact the level of growth. 
 
Our benchmark model is estimated using OLS, fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE). OLS pools observations across cross 
sections and by using all the variation in the data tends to be more efficient than performing individual OLS on repeated cross 
sections. The drawback of the pooled OLS is that it does not account for potential endogeneity of the independent variables with 
respect to country-specific variations which are unmodelled and unobserved. In general, the variables measured with an error 
term tend to display a bias toward zero and OLS does not account for standard errors from the first stage estimator (see Arellano 
et al. 2009).  
The RE estimator is advantageous over OLS in that it provides efficient estimates in the presence of country-specific 
factors which are correlated with the independent variables. The RE estimator controls for time-invariant differences as well as 
time-varying difference between the sample of countries such that the estimated coefficients for equation (15) will not be biased 
due to omitted time-invariant characteristics and time-varying characteristics. The FE estimator is a special case of the RE 
estimator and controls for time-invariant differences.  
The FE and RE estimators, however, have their limitations: estimates may be biased or inconsistent if the independent variables 
are correlated with the error term. The FE estimator is inconsistent when the time dimensionT , is small relative to country 
dimension N , and the RE estimator is inconsistent because the transformed regressions are correlated with the transformed 
errors (Ralhan & Dayanandan 2005). The proposed solution to this problem was forwarded by Arellano and Bond (AB, 1991), 
who pioneered the differenced-GMM estimator (DIFF-GMM) while Blundell and Bond (BB, 1998) conceptualized the system-
GMM (SYS-GMM)
7
. These estimators help overcome the problem of endogeneity between the set of cross-country independent 
variables and other country specific characteristics. It is also appropriate to utilize the GMM estimators when: i) there are more 
moment conditions than model parameters; and ii) the panel dataset consists of a large country dimension relative to a smaller 
time dimension
8
. Identification in both types of estimators is based on first-differencing and using lagged values of the 
endogenous variables as instruments. In the difference-GMM estimator (GMM-DIFF), lagged levels are used to instruments for 
the differenced right hand side variables, while for the system-GMM estimator (GMM-SYS) the estimated system is composed 
of a difference equation instrumented with lagged levels and additionally a level equation, which is estimated using lagged 
differences as instruments (Bond et al. 2001; Rajan & Subramanian 2008). GMM-DIFF and GMM-SYS both have their 
limitations: the GMM-DIFF may lead to weak-instruments problem due to lagged levels not being correlated with their 
differenced counterparts; on the other hand, the GMM-SYS as the tendency to generate large upward biases in the estimation of 
                                                          
 
8 If the time dimension is large, then dynamic panel bias becomes insignificant – in such a case, a fixed estimator is recommended (see Roodman 2006). Further, as the time 
dimension of the panel increases, the number of instruments in the GMM-SYS and GMM-DIFF tends to explode; additionally, as the cross-sectional dimension increases, the 
Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test may become unreliable.   
the right hand side variables (Hauk & Wacziarg, 2004). Further, for the GMM-DIFF, the level equation instruments, i.e. the 
lagged differences of the endogenous right hand side variables, are valid only if they are orthogonal to the fixed effect. 
Additionally, estimates using difference-GMM tend to display a severe downward bias though the system-GMM is found to be 
more efficient and a more inherit valid instrument sets (Presbitero 2006). Due to neither estimator being perfect, we report for 
both GMM-DIFF and GMM-SYS. The instruments we use for difference-GMM are the potentially endogenous variables 
themselves. The system-GMM uses second order and deeper lags in differences and levels of the potentially endogenous 
regressors. 
 
We employ the following specification tests to support out main hypothesis: 
i) Instrument validity by using Hansen’s J statistic of over-identifying restrictions9.  
ii) Arellano & Bond (1991) AR (1) & AR (2) tests for first and second order serial autocorrelation.  
iii) Hausman test to gauge whether the more efficient model (i.e. the RE), against a less efficient but consistent 
model (i.e. the FE), also gives consistent results (Hansen & Tarp 2000; Clements et. al. 2003; Masud & 
Yontcheva 2005). 
iv) F-test to check whether the coefficients in the FE and RE models are zero. 
 
Our data set is composed of 77 aid recipients. The time period of the study is from 1984 to 2007. The starting year is restricted by 
the availability of the ICRG dataset and the end year is a function of the lack of availability of aid data for Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Ukraine from 2007 onwards. Excluding 
these countries, which are of the same economic bloc, may bias the results. Thus, we have included them and as a consequence 
our series is limited to the year 2007. 
 
5. Empirical Results & Discussion 
 
The data appendix (at the end of the paper) gives an account of the main variables used in our model, their description and 
computation. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the main variables of equation (15). 
 
Table 2 shows the results of equation (15). Moving from column 1 to the right we add more right hand side controls and allow 
variables in equation 
1
k
j irt
j
X

  to be endogenous. Column (1) illustrates the effects of institutional quality and aid volatility on 
growth using pooled OLS. The results show that aid volatility is negatively related to growth. The interaction term is positive and 
strongly significant. This illustrates that a one unit increase in quality (for a given level of aid volatility) mitigates the negative 
impact of volatility on growth. Thus, the interaction term is included to capture the belief that better quality institutions have a 
mitigating effect on the negative impact of aid volatility on a country’s growth. Turning to the other variables estimated using 
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 The Hansen’s J statistic is used in place of the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions because of its consistency in the presence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity 
(Neanidis & Varvarigos, 2009; Roodman, 2007). We make sure we check whether deeper lags of the instrumented variables are correlated with deeper lags of the disturbances. 
OLS: institutional quality retains an intuitive sign and strongly significant sign. Column 2 displays the results of the relationship 
between institutional quality, aid volatility and growth by adding more controls, such as investment, initial per capita GDP, aid 
per capita and policy. Our variables of interest continue to be strongly significant. Institutional quality remains significant, 
though at the 5 per cent level. Investment and initial per capita GDP retain intuitive signs yet initial per captia GDP is not found 
to be significant. The sign of our policy variable aligns with the literature: an increase in the policy (i.e. a decrease in inflation or 
a rise in financial development) leads to an increase in the economic growth. The estimate for aid per capita retains a negative 
and insignificant sign. There are a number of reasons why foreign aid may be negatively correlated with growth: i) aid receipts 
expand a government’s resource base and subsequently reduce its efficiency in collecting taxes, fostering aid dependence and 
fiscal ill discipline, both of which are inimical to economic growth; ii) aid receipts may also have an adverse influence on the 
corruptibility of the incumbent government, since large aid inflows may decrease government accountability (Adam and 
O’Connell 1999, Levy 1988); iii) when part of the aid inflows is spent domestically on non-traded goods and services there is 
excessive demand of non-tradables over tradeables which subsequently increases the relative price of non-tradeables over 
tradeables, inflating the real domestic exchange rate, which harms longer run economic growth (termed the Dutch Disease). 
Column 3 and 4 shows the results of our FE and RE estimators while columns 5 and 6 display output from GMM-SYS and 
GMM-DIFF, respectively. In column 3, the coefficients of our variables of interest reduce in magnitude but still remain strongly 
significant at the 1 per cent level. Coefficients from other variables continue to possess appropriate signs; however, initial GDP 
per capita becomes significant while investment becomes insignificant. The hausman test indicates that the FE estimator is valid 
over the RE. In columns 5 and 6, the values of the coefficients of interest are increasing in magnitude and remain strongly 
significant. In Table 2, all types of estimators produce strongly significant signs consistent with case 1 from our theoretical 
section. Furthermore, our policy index, a composite measure of inflation and financial development, is likely to be correlated 
with other country specific cultural, socioeconomic characteristics such as fertility, distribution of income, social capital, etc. 
(Easterly & Levine, 1997; Alesina & Rodrik, 1994; Temple, 1998). Our aid variable may be correlated with income distribution: 
a rise in income may result in decreased aid flows (Turnbull & Wall, 1994; Alesina & Dollar, 2000). This implies that aid 
volatility and income volatility share a negative correlation. Indeed, Ramey & Ramey (1995)
10
 have shown that income volatility 
has a strong negative correlation with developing country growth. Due to these endogenous relationships among variables, we 
treat the signs and significance of columns 1 through 4 with caution. For the GMM-SYS and GMM-DIFF estimations, however, 
the p values of the Hansen J statistic (0.890/0.272) along with the AR(1) and AR(2) values (0.000/0.289 and 0.000/0.531, 
respectively) indicate that the instruments (i.e. lags of order 2 and 3 of the endogenous regressors) are orthogonal to the error 
term and that the error term is not auto-correlated. Since this is the case for all the system GMM estimations below we will rely 
more on the GMM results than OLS, FE and RE estimations.  
Using the column 5 as our baseline regressions results,  we notice that in an average country, aid volatility affects growth 
negatively unless the institutional quality is above a threshold of 3.52 out of 7 (where 7 represents absolute incorruption). 
Differentiating our baseline equation () with respect to aid volatility we obtain, 2 3 irtz  . Since our mean for institutional 
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 See also Aizeman & Marion, 1999. “Volatility & Investment: Interpreting Evidence From Developing Countries”. 
quality is 2.52, the term 3 irtz  on average does not outweigh 2  for all observations on quality, and thus, we intuitively expect 
growth
V


<0, which is confirmed by a host of aid volatility studies (see Bulir and Hamann 2008, Fielding and Mavrotas 2006, 
Lensink and Morrissey 2000, Arellano et al 2009).   
 Few studies exploring the impact of aid volatility on growth have scrutinized the broader applicability of their results 
through robustness testing. Easterly (2003) and Roodman (2004) demonstrate that most baseline empirical results are susceptible 
to changes in specification, definition of variables, etc.  
To account for such potential sensitivity in our baseline results, we gauge their robustness by testing the following: i) additional 
covariates from the aid-growth literature; ii) different levels of smoothing parameters; iii) an alternative measure of aid volatility; 
iv) non-linearities; and v) alternate samples. 
We test the strength of our key explanatory variables by incorporating additional covariates, such as life expectancy, 
fertility, geography, population, trade share, schooling, ethnic fractionalization, real openness, budget balance, and mortality, 
which have been found in the aid-growth literature to have a significant impact on developing country growth (Barro & Sala-i-
Martin, 1995; Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Clemens et. al, 2004; Varvarigos & Neanidis, 2009; Arellano et. al, 2009; Lensink & 
Morrissey, 2006; Rajan & Subramaniam 2008). Though not a comprehensive set of additional covariates, for the purposes of this 
paper, they serve as a set of plausible (even if restricted) set of covariates which explain a substantial variation in the data, and 
hence allow us to check whether the estimates of the key explanatory variables are robust in a standard specification. The results 
are reported in Table 3. We note that controlling for additional covariates does not alter the baseline results. Both aid volatility 
and institutional quality are appropriately signed at the 1 per cent significance level. Coefficients of the additional control 
variables which are significant are life expectancy and education. Both have a positive sign, reflecting the positive impact that 
initial life expectancy and schooling have on growth. Other additional controls have their expected signs.   
We also explore how changes in the smoothing parameter contained in the Hodrick-Prescott affect our key explanatory 
variables. Researchers follow Hodrick and Prescott (1980, 1997) when applying the filter to quarterly data. Most applications of 
the HP filter are concerned with de-trending quarterly data and few researchers are in agreement on the value of the smoothing 
parameter,  , when the filter is applied to annual data. Maravall & del Rio (2007) recommends using a value of   between 6 
and 14, Backus and Kehoe (1992) use 100, while Baxter and King (1999) suggest a value of 10. Ravn and Uhlig (2002) follow 
analytical methods to determine the optimal smoothing parameter. The first approach shows that aggregating observations 
changes the ratio of the variance between the cyclical component and the second difference of the trend component by the fourth 
power of the frequency of observations. That is, the approach yields a value of 
4
1600
6.25
4
 . The authors test the optimal 
smoothing value by de-trending a U.S GDP data series and using 6.25  for annual data and 1600  for quarterly data, and 
find both series’ producing the same trend. Following Ravn and Uhlig (2002) we use 6.25  .  In the robustness tests we 
employ lamda set to 10, 30, 75 and 100 and compare these to our baseline sample. Results are reported in Table 4. Our variables 
of interest statistically survive various computations of aid volatility and are significant at least at the 5 per cent level. This 
suggests that the results in our baseline sample are not biased by the choice of lambda.  
Following Afonso & Fureri (2008) we test the sensitivity of our baseline results against an alternative measure of aid 
volatility. We utilize the Baxter King bandpass filter (BK filter) to compute an alternative measure. The BK filter removes both 
high and low frequency components of the series, leaving business-cycle frequencies. Baxter & King (1999) argue that the 
optimal filter is a moving average process with an infinite order. For practical purposes, however, we must approximate the filter 
with finite moving averages. In their paper, they recommend using a 7-year centered moving average when dealing with 
quarterly or annual data. Results using the BK filter as a measure for aid volatility are reported in Table 5. Using BK filter to 
compute aid volatility does not alter our baseline sample results: key variables are significant at least at the 5 per cent level. 
Further, we test the strength of significance of our key variables by incorporating non-linear variables in our baseline 
equation. Hadjimichael et al. (1995) were one of the first authors to employ non-linear effects of aid. Non-linear aid effects may 
be present for the following reasons: i) Due to absorptive capacity constraints a country may possess limited capacity (beyond a 
specific threshold) absorbing aid inflows into productive works; ii) Aid given beyond a specific threshold may be harmful for the 
country’s economic conditions. Several studies on aid-growth regressions have highlighted the importance of recognizing non-
linearities (Durbarry et al., 1998; Lensink and White, 2001; Hansen and Tarp, 2000, 2001). Following Rajan & Subramaniam 
(2008) and Hansen & Tarp (200), we include the interaction between aid and policy, aid and geography and an aid squared and 
policy squared terms in our baseline regression. The variables of interest continue to be strongly significant at the 5 per cent 
level.  
Table 7 presents robustness results with alternative samples. Columns 1 through 4 test the sensitivity of the baseline 
results with respect to particular continent. We subtract those countries in the African continent, Asian continent, European 
continent and those in the Americas one at a time from our base sample. Our results remain comfortably significant at least at the 
5 per cent level in all cases save for column 2. The signs for the coefficients appearing in column 2 are only marginally 
significant (i.e. at the 10 per cent level). Eliminating European countries from our base sample may eliminate some highly 
corrupt countries experiencing extreme aid volatility, and thus, may eliminate substantial variation in our data. That is, 
eliminating European countries decreases sample heterogeneity because of selecting out an economic bloc containing countries 
with similar historical, economic and political factors shaping the quality of their institutional environments. In columns 5 
through 7 we eliminate former British, Spanish and French colonies from our baseline sample. The signs and significance for our 
key variables remain unaffected at the 1 per cent level. The literature on aid-growth has documented potential problems caused 
by outliers (Burnside & Dollar 2000; Gomanee et al 2002; Hansen & Tarp 2000, Dalgaard & Hansen 2001). Following Hodler & 
Bhattacharyya 2010, in columns 8 and 9 we omit influential observations by using Cook’s distance and DFITS. Cook’s distance 
proposes that an observation is to be deemed an outlier and thus omitted if 4 /icooksd n  while DFITS test eliminates 
observations if  
1/2
2 /iDFITS k n , where k is the number of independent variables in the baseline equation and n  is the 
number of observations in the baseline sample (see Belsley et al. 1980) Our key variables survive these tests.  
Our baseline regressions use 3 year averages. Easterly (2003) and Roodman (2007), however, show how different period 
averages significantly alter baseline results. Since cross country growth regressions utilize 4/5 year averages and sometimes 9 
year averages (see Varvarigos & Neanidis, 2009) in order to test the longer run effects of key variables on economic growth, we 
compute 7 year and 11 year period averages to test the significance of our key variables. To estimate these longer run averages 
we employ FE over GMM-SYS and GMM-DIFF due to the constraint of having lesser number of observations than the number 
required to take 2
nd
 order lags in GMM-estimations. These results support our baseline findings – the volatility and interaction 
terms are significant at least at the 5 per cent level
11
.  
 
6. Conclusion: 
 
We study the effects of an increase in aid volatility on growth as well as an increase in the institutional quality on the marginal 
impact of aid volatility on growth. Using a simple utility maximization framework, we analyze the tradeoff between government 
self-consumption (corruption) and longer term infrastructure investment. Comparative statics highlight how aid volatility has a 
negative effect on growth, while an increase in institutional quality mitigates the negative marginal impact of aid volatility under 
specific conditions with respect the government’s and households’ marginal utility.  
The empirical findings accord with case 1 from our theoretical model.  That is, we find that governments in our sample of 
countries face a situation of increasing marginal benefits in consumption equal to or greater than those of households. This 
implies that given an increase in institutional quality, governments are inclined at the margin to raise optimal public investment 
and transfers expenditure in the face of higher aid volatility due to fear of losing office. Our empirical results confirm this 
theoretical prediction over various computations of aid volatility, sub-samples, additional covariates and non-linearities.  
With respect to policy prescriptions, foreign aid would be more effective if aid volatility were reduced and the quality of 
institutions strengthened. It would be more wise a practice for international agencies such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and The World Bank to take on board a prescriptive aid policy plan for LDCs by incorporating institutional quality into 
their calculus as a factor of considerable weight. The IMF and The World Bank have thus far provided analytical support for aid 
policy implementation with respect to corruption and aid volatility as factors having separate merit. A suggestion would be to 
take both factors into account simultaneously and in an integrated fashion when evaluating aid programs. It is required that the 
actual level of aid given to LDCs be more consistently aligned with the expected levels of aid, while at the same time, developing 
stronger democratic, accountable and less corrupt systems of governance. In this way, aid-recipient countries facing more 
predictable aid flow disbursements and enjoying higher levels of institutional quality are more likely to devote aid expenditure to 
productive investment rather than corrupt private expenditure.  
References:  
 
Adam, C.S. and S.A. O’Connell, (1999), “Aid, Taxation and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa”, Economics and Politics, vol 
11(3), 225-253. 
 
Afonso, A. and D. Fureri, (2008). “Government Size, Composition, Volatility an Economic Growth.” European Central Bank, 
Working Paper Series, No.849. 
                                                          
11
 Results are not reported to save space, but are available upon request.    
Agénor, P-R. and J. Aizenman, (2010). "Aid volatility and poverty traps," Journal of Development Economics, 91(1), 1-7. 
 
Alesina, A. and D. Dollar, (2000).  “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?” Journal of Economic Growth, 5(1), 33-63 
 
Alesina, A. and D. Rodrik, (1994). “Distributive Politics and Economic Growth”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(2), 
465-490 
 
Arellano, C., A. Bulir, T. Lane, and L. Lipschitz, (2009). “The dynamic implications of foreign aid and its variability. “Journal of 
Development Economics, 88(1), 87-102. 
 
Arellano, M. and S. Bond, (1991). “Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an application to 
employment equations.” The Review of Economic Studies, 58, 277 – 297. 
 
Backus, D.K.., and P. J. Kehoe,  (1992). “International Evidence on the Historical Properties of Business Cycles.” American 
Economic Review, 82(4), 864–888 
 
Barro, R.J., and X. Sala-i-Martin, (1995). Economic growth. McGraw Hill, New York. 
 
Bauer, P. (1972), Dissent on Development, Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Bauer, P. (1991). The development frontier: essays in applied economics, London, Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
 
Baxter, M. and R.G. King, (1999). “Measuring Business Cycles: Approximate Band-Pass Filters For Economic Time Series.” 
The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, 81(4), 575-593 
 
Bhattacharyya, S. and R. Hodler, (2010). "Natural resources, democracy and corruption." European Economic Review, 54(4), 
608-621 
 
Belsley, D., E. Kuh, and R. Welsch, (1980). Regressions Diagnostics: Identifying Influential Data 
and Sources of Collinearity. John Wiley & Sons, New York. 
 
Bleaney, M.F. (1996). “Macroeconomic stability, investment and growth in developing countries.” Journal of Development 
Economics 48, 461–477. 
 
Blundell, R. and S. Bond, (1998). “Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models”. Journal of 
Econometrics, 87, 115–143. 
 
Bond, S.R., A. Hoeffler and J. Temple, (2001). “GMM Estimation of Empirical Growth Models”, CEPR Discussion Papers 3048, 
C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 
 
Boone, P. (1994). “The impact of foreign aid on savings and growth.” Mimeo, London School of Economics. 
 
Bulir, A. and A.J. Hamann, (2003). “Aid Volatility: An Empirical Assessment.” IMF Staff Papers, 50(1), 64-89. 
 
Bulir, A. and A. Hamann, (2008). “Volatility of Development Aid: From the Frying Pan into the Fire?” World Development, 
36(10), 2048-2066. 
 
Bulir, A. and T. Lane, (2004). “Aid and Fiscal Management,” in Helping Countries Develop: The Role of Fiscal Policy, ed. by 
Gupta, S., Clements, B. and Inchauste, G. International Monetary Fund, Washington. 
 
Burnside, C. and D. Dollar, (1997). “Aid spurs growth – in a sound policy environment”, Finance and Development, 34 (4), 4 – 
7. 
 
Burnside, C. and D. Dollar, (2000). “Aid, Policies, and Growth.” American Economic Review, 90, 847–868. 
 
Chatterjee, S. and S. Turnovsky,  (2007). “Foreign aid and economic growth: The role of flexible labor supply.” Journal of 
Development Economics, 84(1), 507-533 
 
Chauvet, L. and P. Guillaumont, (2004). “Aid and Growth Revisited: Policy, Economic Vulnerability and Political Instability.” 
In B. Tungodden, N. Stern and I. Kolstad (eds), (2004). Toward Pro-Poor Policies: Aid, Institutions and Globalization. World 
Bank, Washington, DC. 
 
Chauvet, L. and P. Guillaumont, (2009). “Aid, Volatility and Growth Again. When Aid Volatility Matters and When it does not.” 
Review of Development Economics, 13(3), 452-463. 
 
Chenery, H.B. and A.M. Strout, (1966). “Foreign Assistance and Economic Development.” The American Economic Review, 
LVI (4) Part I 
 
Chervin, C. and S. van Wijnbergen, (2010). “Economic Growth and the Volatility of Foreign Aid.” Tinbergen Institute 
Discussion Paper 
 
Clemens, M. A., S. Radelet and R. Bhavnani, (2004). “Counting chickens when they hatch: the short term effect of aid on 
growth.” Working Paper No. 44, Center for Global Development 
 
Clements, B., R. Bhattacharya and T.Q. Nguyen, (2003), "External debt, Public Investment and Growth in Low Income 
Countries," IMF Working Paper 03/249. 
 
Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler, (2004). “Aid, policy and growth in post-conflict societies.” European Economic Review, 48(5), 1125-
1145. 
 
Collier, P. and D. Dollar, (2002), “Aid Allocation and Poverty Reduction.” European Economic Review, 46 (8), 1475-1500. 
 
Dalgaard, C. and H. Hansen, (2001). “On Aid, Growth and Good Policies.” Journal of Development Studies, 37(6), 17-41 
 
Dalgaard, C., H. Hansen, and F. Tarp (2004). “On the Empirics of Foreign Aid and Growth.” Economic Journal, 114(496), 191-
216 
 
Dowling, M. and U. Hiemenz, (1982). "Aid, Savings and Growth in the Asian Region.” Economic Office Report Series 3, Asian 
Development Bank: Manila. 
 
Durbarry, R., N. Gemmell, and D. Greenaway, (1998). “New evidence on the impact of foreign aid on economic growth.” 
CREDIT Research Paper 98r8. University of Nottingham, Nottingham. 
 
Easterly, W. (1993). “How Much Do Distortions Affect Growth?” Journal of Monetary Economics 32(2), 187–212. 
 
Easterly, W. (1999) “The Ghost of Financing Gap: Testing the Growth Model of the International Financial Institutions”, Journal 
of Development Economics, (60)2, 423-438 
 
Easterly, W. and R. Levine, (1997). “Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions.” The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, MIT Press, 112(4), 1203-50 
 
Easterly, W. (2001). The The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists' Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics. Cambridge 
MA: MIT Press, 2001 
 
Easterly, W. (2003). Can foreign aid buy growth? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17, 23-48 
 
Epstein, G.S. and I. Gang, (2009). “Ethnicity, Assimilation and Harassment in the Labor Market.” Research in Labor Economics, 
79, 67-90 
 
Fielding, D. and G. Mavrotas, (2006). “The Volatility of Aid.” WIDER discussion paper 2005/06, UNU-WIDER, Helsinki. 
 
Fischer, S. (1991). “Growth, macroeconomics and development.” NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1991, Vol. 6, ed. Olivier Jean 
Blanchard and Stanley Fischer, pp. 329–64. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press/National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
Fischer, S. (1993). “The role of macroeconomics factors in growth.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 32, 485-512. 
 
Gomanee, K., S. Girma and O. Morrissey, (2002), “Aid and Growth in sub-Saharan Africa: 
Accounting for Transmission Mechanisms”, University of Nottingham, School of Economics, CREDIT Research Paper 02/05. 
 
Gomanee, K., S. Girma and O. Morrissey, (2003). “Searching for Aid Threshold Effects: Aid, Growth and the Welfare of the 
Poor.” CREDIT Research Paper 02/05, Centre for Research in Economic Development and International Trade, University of 
Nottingham, Nottingham. 
 
Griffin, K. (1970). “Foreign Capital, Domestic Savings and Economics Development.” Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute 
of Economics and Statistics, 32 (2), 99-112. 
 
Griffin, K., and J. Enos, (1970). “Foreign Assistance, Objectives and Consequences.” Economic Development and Cultural 
Change 18. 
 
Hadjimichael, M.T., D. Ghura, M. Mühleisen, R. Nord, E.M. Ucer, (1995). “Sub-Saharan Africa: Growth, savings, and 
investment.” 1986-93. IMF Occasional Paper, No. 118 
 
Hansen, H. and F. Tarp, (2000). “Aid effectiveness disputed.” Journal of International Development 12, 375–398. 
 
Hansen, H. and F. Tarp, (2001). “Aid and growth regressions.” Journal of Development Economics, 64(2), 547-570. 
 
Hauk, W. R., Jr., and R. Wacziarg, (2004). “A Monte Carlo Study of Growth Regressions,” Stanford University mimeograph 
 
Hodrick, R.J. and E.C. Prescott, (1980). “Post-war U.S. business cycles: an empirical investigation.” Mimeo (Carnegie-Mellon 
University, Pittsburgh, PA) 
 
Kanbur, R. (2000). “Income Distribution and Development.” In A.B. Atkinson and F. Bourguignon (editors), Handbook of 
Income Distribution, Volume I. Amsterdam. North Holland-Elsevier. 
 
Kangoye, T, (2011). “Does Aid Unpredictability Weaken Governance? New Evidence from Developing Countries”, Working 
Paper Series, African Development Bank, No. 137. 
 
Kimball, M. (1990). “Precautionary saving in the small and in the large.” Econometrica. 58, 53-73. 
 
Kraay, A. and C. Raddatz, (2007). “Poverty Traps, Aid, and Growth.” Journal of Development Economics, 82(2), 315-47. 
 
Lahiri, S. and K. Michaelowa, (eds.) (2006): “The Political Economy of Aid.” Review of Development Economics, 10 2), Special 
Edition 
 
Lensink, R. and O. Morrissey, (2000). “Aid Instability as a Measure of Uncertainty and the Positive Impact of Aid on Growth.” 
Journal of Development Studies, 36, 31–49. 
 
Lensink, R. and O. Morrissey, (2006). “Foreign Direct Investment: Flows, Volatility, and the Impact on Growth.” Review of 
International Economics, 14, 478–493. 
 Lensink, W. and H. White, (2001). "Are There Negative Returns to Aid?" The Journal of Development Studies, 37(6), 42-65 
 
Levy, V. (1988). “Aid and growth in sub-Saharan Africa: the recent experience.” European Economic Review, 32, 9. 
 
Maravall, A. and A. del Rio, (2007). “Temporal aggregation, systematic sampling, and the Hodrick-Prescott filter.” 
Computational Statistics & Data Analysis, 52(2), 975-998 
 
Masud, N. and B. Yontcheva, (2005). “Does Foreign Aid Reduce Poverty? Empirical Evidence from Nongovernmental and 
Bilateral Aid.” International Monetary Fund Working Paper  
 
McGillivray, M., Feeny, S., Hermes, N. and R. Lensink (2006), “Controversies Over the Impact of Development 
Aid: It Works; It Doesn’t; It Can, But It Depends….”, Journal of International Development, 18, 1031-1050. 
 
Mosley, P. (1980), "Aid, savings and growth revisited," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 42 (2), 79–95. 
 
Mosley, P., J. Hudson and S. Horrell, (1987). “Aid, the Public Sector and the Market in Less Developed 
Countries.” Economic Journal, 97, 616-41. 
 
Mosley, P. and J. Hudson, (2008). “Aid volatility, policy and development.” World Development, 36, 2082-102. 
 
Nelson. R, (1956). “A theory of the low-level equilibrium trap in underdeveloped economies.” American Economic Review, 46 
(5), 894–908 
 
Pallage, S. and M. Robe, (2001). “Foreign aid and the Business Cycle,” Review of International Economics, 9(4), 641-672. 
 
Papanek, G.F. (1973). “Aid, foreign private Investment, Savings and Growth in Less Developed countries.” Journal of Political 
Economy, 81, 121-30. 
 
Presbitero, A.F. (2006). "The debt-growth nexus in poor countries: a reassessment.", Proceedings of the German Development 
Economics Conference, Berlin 2006 22, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics. 
 
Raghuram G. R. and A. Subramanian, (2008). “Aid and Growth: What Does the Cross-Country Evidence Really Show?”, The 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(4), 643-665. 
 
Ralhan, M. and A. Dayanandan, (2005) “Convergence of Income Among Provinces in Canada- An Application of GMM 
Estimation.” Econometrics Working Paper EWP0502, Department of Economics, University of Victoria, Canada. 
 
Ramey, G. and V. Ramey, (1995). “Cross-country evidence on the link between volatility and growth.” The American Economic 
Review, 85, 1138–1151. 
 
Ravn, M.O and H. Uhlig, (2002). “On adjusting the Hodrick-Prescott filter for the frequency of observations.” The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, 84(2), 371-375 
 
Roodman, D. (2004). “The anarchy of numbers: Aid, development, and cross-country empirics.” Center for Global Development 
working paper no. 32 
 
Roodman, D. (2007). “The Anarchy of Numbers: Aid, Development, and Cross-Country Empirics.” World Bank Review, 21, 
255–277. 
 
Singh, R.D. (1985). “State Intervention, Foreign Economic Aid, Savings and Growth in LDCs: Some recent Evidence.” Kyklos, 
38, 216 – 232. 
 
Stern, N. (2002). “Making the Case for Aid,” in World Bank, A Case for Aid: Building a Consensus for Development Assistance 
The World Bank, Washington. 
 
Stiglitz, J. (2002). “Overseas Aid is Money Well Spent,” Financial Times (April 14). 
 
Temple, J. and H-J. Voth, (1998). "Human capital, equipment investment, and industrialization," European Economic Review, 
42(7), 1343-1362. 
 
Trumbull, W.N. and H.J. Wall, (1994). “Estimating aid-allocation criteria with panel data.” Economic Journal, 104, 876-882. 
 
Voivodas, C.S., (1973). “Exports, Foreign Capital Inflow and Economic Growth.” Journal of International Economics., 3, 4, 
337-49. 
 
Yap, J.T, 2003. “The Output Gap and its Role in Inflation-Targeting in the Philippines”, Discussion papers from Philippine 
Institute for Development Studies, No DP2003-10.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RESULTS & DATA APPENDIX 
 
TABLE 1. – Summary Statistics. 
 
Variable      Mean      St.dev. Min Max 
Average annual growth 
Per Capita 
 
     0.009       0.058 -0.406 0.122 
Institutional Quality ( )z  2.521 1.069 0.000 5.000 
Aid volatility ( )v  0.286 0.404 0.006 2.954 
Interaction ( )z v  0.682 1.142 0.000 12.303 
Investment 20.937 6.785 3.246 57.394 
Initial Income 7.015 1.300 4.416 10.459 
Aid per capita 5.933 9.193 0.000 67.929 
Policy  0.004 5.885 -17.465 14.868 
N= number of observations 469    
TABLE 2: Impact of Volatility & Interaction Effects on Growth, OLS, FE/RE and GMM Estimations 
(Dependent Variable is Average Annual Growth of Per Capita GDP) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ***, **, 
and 
*
 indicate significance level at 1%, 5%  and 10% respectively, against a two-sided alternative. Figures in parentheses are p-
values. All regressions except those in column (1) and (2) are carried out without an intercept. Constant terms, country and time 
dummies not reported. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 OLS OLS FE RE GMM-SYS GMM-DIFF 
Quality 0.008** 
(0.002) 
0.007** 
(0.030) 
0.016*** 
(0.005) 
0.008* 
(0.093) 
0.005  
(0.486) 
0.010 
(0.340) 
Volatility -0.096*** 
(0.000) 
-0.107*** 
(0.000) 
-0.900 
(0.000) 
 
-0.107*** 
(0.000) 
-0.155*** 
(0.001) 
-.171*** 
(0.004) 
Interaction 0.028*** 
(0.000) 
0.028*** 
(0.002) 
0.026*** 
(0.002) 
0.032*** 
(0.000) 
0.044*** 
(0.002) 
0.052*** 
(0.004) 
Investment ----- 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.239) 
0.001*** 
(0.008) 
0.002** 
(0.013) 
.002 
(0.188) 
Initial GDP per capita (ln) ----- -0.003 
(0.189) 
-0.086 
(0.000) 
-0.004 
(0.164) 
-0.004 
(0.359) 
-0.030 
(0.349) 
Aid per capita ----- -0.0002  
(0.411) 
0.0002 
(0.764) 
-0.0002 
(0.622) 
-0.0002 
(0.654) 
0.001 
(0.286) 
Policy ----- 1.650*** 
(0.000) 
1.385*** 
(0.001) 
1.637*** 
(0.000) 
3.060*** 
(0.000) 
2.655*** 
(0.001) 
Countries/N 77/469 77/469 77/469 77/469 77/469 77/469 
adj. R2 0.250 0.32 0.021 0.33   
 
Endogenous variables used as instruments  
 
 
 
 
No. of lags of endogenous 
variables used in instrumentation 
     
Institutional 
quality, 
Interaction, 
policy, aid, initial 
GDP, investment  
 
Three 
 
 
Institutional 
quality, 
Interaction, 
policy, aid, initial 
GDP, investment 
 
Three 
 
AR(1) test (p-value)     0.000 0.000 
AR(2) test (p-value)     0.289 0.531 
 
Chi-square (Hansen J-statistic) 
 
F-test 
 
Hausman test 
   
 
 
0.000 
 
chi2(7)= 104.22 
(0.000) 
 
 
 
0.000 
 
0.890 
 
0.272 
       
TABLE 3: Impact of Volatility & Interaction Effects on Growth with Additional Controls, GMM Estimations (Dependent Variable is 
Average Annual Growth of Per Capita GDP) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM 
Quality 0.003 
(0.697) 
0.007 
(0.428) 
0.005 
(0.472) 
0.005 
(0.487) 
0.006 
(0.411) 
0.014
*
 
(0.060) 
0.005 
(0.471) 
0.003 
(0.673) 
0.006 
(0.431) 
0.013
***
 
(0.192)
 
Volatility -
0.162
***
 
(0.000) 
-0.152
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.155
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.156
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.159
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.116
***
 
(0.000) 
-0.154
***
 
(0.002) 
-
0.203
***
 
(0.000) 
-
0.155
***
 
(0.004) 
-
0.145
***
 
(0.000) 
Interaction 0.049
***
 
(0.001) 
0.042
***
 
(0.005) 
0.044
***
 
(0.003) 
0.045
***
 
(0.003) 
0.045
***
 
(0.002) 
0.031
***
 
(0.009) 
0.044
***
 
(0.004) 
0.054
***
 
(0.000) 
0.044
***
 
(0.008) 
0.030
***
 
(0.000) 
Investment 0.002
**
 
(0.065) 
0.002
***
 
(0.007) 
0.002
**
 
(0.042) 
0.002
**
 
(0.033) 
0.002
**
 
(0.027) 
0.003
***
 
(0.000) 
0.002
**
 
(0.016) 
0.002 
(0.111) 
0.002
**
 
(0.056) 
0.002
**
 
(0.022) 
Initial  
GDP per capita (ln) 
-0.007
*
 
(0.239) 
-0.002 
(0.576)) 
-0.004 
(0.393) 
 
-0.004 
(0.389) 
-0.006 
(0.160) 
-0.013
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.004 
(0.382) 
-0.004 
(0.437) 
-0.003 
(0.453) 
-0.006
*
 
(0.062) 
Aid per capita 0.001 
(0.440) 
0.001 
(0. 250) 
-0.0002 
(0.613) 
-0.003 
(0.601) 
-0.0002 
(0.770) 
-0.0002 
(0.704) 
-0.0001 
(0.826) 
0.0002 
(0.815) 
-0.0002 
(0.544) 
-
0.0004
**
*
 
(0.638) 
Policy 2.94
***
 
(0.000) 
2.771
***
 
(0.000) 
3.131
***
 
(0.000) 
3.096 
(0.000) 
2.914 
(0.000) 
1.970
***
 
(0.009) 
3.070 
(0.000) 
2.785 
(0.000) 
3.121
***
 
(0.000) 
2.281 
(0.002) 
Life exp(ln) 0.006  
(0.596) 
         
Fertility  -0.005
**
 
(0.048) 
        
Geography   -0.0001 
(0.878) 
 
       
Population    -0.000 
(0.867) 
 
      
Trade Share    
 
 0.018 
(0.111) 
     
Schooling       .0004
*
 
(0.065) 
 
    
Ethnic Frac       -0.005 
(0.795) 
 
   
Real Openness        0.0002 
(0.277) 
  
Budget Balance 
 
        0.0003 
(0.248) 
 
Mortality          -.0009 
(0.605) 
Countries/N 
 
77/453 77/469 77/469 77/469 77/469 77/469 77/469 77/469 77/469 77/469 
Endogenous  
variables used as 
instruments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. of lags of 
endogenous 
Instituti
onal 
quality, 
Interacti
on, 
policy, 
aid, 
initial 
GDP, 
investm
ent 
 
 
Three 
 
 
 
Institutio
nal 
quality, 
Interactio
n, policy, 
aid, 
initial 
GDP, 
investme
nt 
 
 
 
Three 
 
Institutio
nal 
quality, 
Interactio
n, policy, 
aid, 
initial 
GDP, 
investme
nt 
 
 
 
Three 
 
Institution
al quality, 
Interactio
n, policy, 
aid, initial 
GDP, 
investmen
t 
 
 
 
 
 
Three 
 
Institutio
nal 
quality, 
Interactio
n, policy, 
aid, 
initial 
GDP, 
investme
nt 
 
 
 
Three 
 
Institutional 
quality, 
Interaction, 
policy, aid, 
initial GDP, 
investment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Three 
 
Institutio
nal 
quality, 
Interactio
n, policy, 
aid, 
initial 
GDP, 
investme
nt 
 
 
 
Three 
 
Instituti
onal 
quality, 
Interacti
on, 
policy, 
aid, 
initial 
GDP, 
investm
ent 
 
 
Three 
 
Instituti
onal 
quality, 
Interacti
on, 
policy, 
aid, 
initial 
GDP, 
investm
ent 
 
 
Three 
 
Instituti
onal 
quality, 
Interacti
on, 
policy, 
aid, 
initial 
GDP, 
investm
ent 
 
 
Three 
 
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.219 0.275 0.294 0.292 0.303 0.160 0.288 0.170 0.409 0.121 
Hansen J-statistic 0.812 0.791 0.803 0.807 0.771 0.662 0.776 0.840 0.863 0.788 
           
***, **, 
and 
*
 indicate significance level at 1%, 5%  and 10% respectively, against a two-sided alternative. Figures in parentheses are p-values. 
All regressions except those in column (1) and (2) are carried out without an intercept. Constant terms, country and time dummies not 
reported. 
 
 
 
TABLE 4: Impact of Volatility & Interaction Effects on Growth with Different Smoothing Parameters (Dependent 
Variable is Average Annual Growth of Per Capita GDP)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 GMM-
DIFF 
GMM-SYS GMM-DIFF GMM-SYS GMM-DIFF GMM-SYS GMM-
DIFF 
GMM-SYS 
Quality 0.008  
(0.453) 
 
.002  
(0.836) 
0.008
 
(0.438) 
.003  
(0.566) 
0.008 
(0.423) 
0.004 
(0.452) 
0.008 
(0.396) 
0.005 
(0.385) 
Volatility ( 10  ) -0.164
***
 
(0.009) 
 
-0.159 
(0.002) 
----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
Volatility ( 30  ) 
 
----- ----- -0.157  
(0.011) 
-0.147 
***     
(0.002) 
----- ----- ----- ----- 
Volatility ( 75  ) ----- ----- ----- ----- -0.147 
(0.008) 
-0.135 
(0.000) 
----- ----- 
Volatility ( 100  ) ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -0.142 
(0.006) 
-0.128 
(0.001) 
Interaction ( 10  ) 0.050
***
 
(0.002) 
0.047
***
 
(0.002) 
----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
Interaction ( 30  ) 
 
----- 
 
----- 0.048 
*** 
(0.003) 
0.042
*** 
(0.002) 
----- ----- ----- ----- 
Interaction ( 75  ) 
 
----- 
 
----- ----- ----- 0.045 
(0.002) 
0.039 
(0.001) 
 
----- ----- 
Interaction ( 100  ) 
 
----- 
 
----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 0.044 
(0.002) 
0.038 
(0.001) 
Investment 0.002 
(0.229) 
0.001 
(0.139) 
0.002  
(0.212) 
0.001 
(0.111) 
0.002 
(0.165) 
0.002 
(0.109) 
0.001 
(0.126) 
.002 
(0.046) 
  
Initial GDP per capita 
(ln) 
-0.026 
(0.467) 
 
-0.005 
(0.440) 
-0.026 
(0.480) 
-0.001  
(0.646) 
-0.023 
(0.523) 
-0.003 
(0.444(=) 
-0.021 
(0.555) 
-0.004 
(0.355) 
Aid per capita .0007 
(0.551) 
 
-.0006 
(0.431) 
.0006  
(0.517) 
-0.0003 
(0.585) 
.0007 
(0.474) 
-.0002 
(0.674) 
0.001 
(0.421) 
-.0001 
(0.735) 
Policy 
 
2.615 
(0.003) 
 
2.615 
(0.000) 
2.565 
(0.003) 
2.702 
(0.000) 
2.495 
(0.002) 
2.851 
(0.000) 
2.484 
(0.002) 
2.927 
(0.000) 
Countries/N 77/396 77/469 
 
77/396 77/469 77/396 77/469 77/396 77/469 
Endogenous variables 
used as instruments 
Institutiona
l quality, 
Interaction, 
policy, aid, 
initial 
GDP, 
investment 
 
Institutional 
quality, 
Interaction, 
policy, aid, 
initial GDP, 
investment 
Institutional 
quality, 
Interaction, 
policy, aid, 
initial GDP, 
investment 
Institutional 
quality, 
Interaction, 
policy, aid, 
initial GDP, 
investment 
Institutional 
quality, 
Interaction, 
policy, aid, 
initial GDP, 
investment 
Institutional 
quality, 
Interaction, 
policy, aid, 
initial GDP, 
investment 
Institution
al quality, 
Interactio
n, policy, 
aid, initial 
GDP, 
investmen
t 
Institutiona
l quality, 
Interaction, 
policy, aid, 
initial 
GDP, 
investment 
No. of lags of 
endogenous 
variables used in 
instrumentation 
Three 
 
Three 
 
Three 
 
Three 
 
Three 
 
Three 
 
Three 
 
Three 
 
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.755 0.535 0.735 0.506 0.711 0.471 0.697 0.474 
Hansen J-statistic 0.295 0.860 0.279 0.882 0.267 0.822 0.252 0.790 
         
         
***, **, 
and 
*
 indicate significance level at 1%, 5%  and 10% respectively, against a two-sided alternative. Figures in parentheses are p-values. 
All regressions except those in column (1) and (2) are carried out without an intercept. Constant terms, country and time dummies not 
reported. 
 
TABLE 5: Impact of Volatility & Interaction Effects on Growth with alternative measure of aid volatility (Dependent 
Variable is Average Annual Growth of Per Capita GDP)  
 (1) (2) 
 GMM-DIFF GMM-SYS 
Quality 0.007 
(0.609) 
 
0.003 
(0.740) 
Volatility (using BK filter) -0.210 
(0.029) 
-.191 
(0.045) 
 
Interaction 0.077 
(0.026) 
 
0.074 
(0.028) 
Investment 0.002 
(0.270) 
0.002 
(0.385) 
Initial GDP per capita (ln) -0.082 
(0.139) 
 
-0.004 
(0.448) 
Aid per capita 0.002 
(0.211) 
 
0.001 
(0.905) 
Policy 4.262 
(0.001) 
3.356  
(0.000) 
Countries/N 77/396 77/469 
 Endogenous variables used as 
instruments 
Institutional 
quality, 
Interaction, 
policy, aid, 
initial GDP, 
investment 
 
Institutional 
quality, 
Interaction, 
policy, aid, 
initial GDP, 
investment 
No. of lags of endogenous 
variables used in instrumentation 
 
Three Three 
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.003 0.001 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.800 0.872 
Hansen J-statistic 0.447 0.603 
   
   
   
***, **, 
and 
*
 indicate significance level at 1%, 5%  and 10% respectively, against a two-sided alternative. Figures in parentheses are p-values. All 
regressions except those in column (1) and (2) are carried out without an intercept. Constant terms, country and time dummies not reported. 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 6: Effect of Non-linearities on the Impact of Volatility & Interaction Effects on Growth 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 GMM-SYS GMM-SYS GMM-SYS GMM-SYS 
Quality 0.004 
(0.583) 
 
0.005 
(0.431) 
0.005 
(0.438) 
.005 
(0.487) 
Volatility -0.160 
(0.000) 
-0.149 
(0.002) 
 
-0.160 
(0.001) 
-0.155 
(0.001) 
Interaction 0.045 
(0.002) 
 
0.043 
(0.003) 
0.043 
(0.004) 
0.045 
(0.003) 
Investment 0.002 
(0.019) 
.001 
(0.009) 
0.002 
(0.028) 
0.001 
(0.013) 
Initial GDP per capita (ln) -0.003 
(0.451) 
 
-0.005 
(0.275) 
-0.004 
(0.402) 
-.004 
(0.328) 
Aid per capita -0.001 
(0.031) 
 
-0.0003 
(0.531) 
-0.002 
(0.009) 
-.0002 
(0.681) 
Policy 3.017 
(0.000) 
3.578  
(0.000) 
3.162 
(0.000) 
3.137 
(0.000) 
     
Aid x Geography 0.012    
 (0.050)    
 
Aid x Policy 
 
 
 
-0.076 
  
  (0.383)   
 
Aid Squared 
   
0.007 
 
   (0.017)  
     
Policy Squared -74.779 
(0.560) 
Countries/N 
 
77/469 77/469 77/469 77/469 
Endogenous variables used as 
instruments 
Institutional 
quality, 
Interaction, 
policy, aid, 
initial GDP, 
investment 
 
Institutional 
quality, 
Interaction, 
policy, aid, 
initial GDP, 
investment 
Institutional 
quality, 
Interaction, 
policy, aid, 
initial GDP, 
investment 
Institutional 
quality, 
Interaction, 
policy, aid, 
initial GDP, 
investment 
No. of lags of endogenous 
variables used in instrumentation 
 
Three Three Three Three 
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.284 0.299 0.263 0.317 
Hansen J-statistic 0.825 0.818 0.829 0.799 
     
     
     
***, **, 
and 
*
 indicate significance level at 1%, 5%  and 10% respectively, against a two-sided alternative. Figures in parentheses are p-values. All 
regressions except those in column (1) and (2) are carried out without an intercept. Constant terms, country and time dummies not reported. 
 
TABLE 7: Impact of Volatility & Interaction Effects on Growth using alternate samples (Dependent Variable is Average 
Annual Growth of Per Capita GDP)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Base sample 
without 
Africa 
Base sample 
without 
Europe 
Base sample 
without Asia 
Base sample 
without 
Americas 
Base sample 
without 
British 
Colonies 
Base sample 
without 
French 
Colonies 
Base sample 
without 
Spanish 
Colonies 
Obs. omitted 
using 
Cook’s 
Distance 
Obs. 
omitted 
using 
DFITS 
Quality 0.012 
(0.160) 
 
0.010 
(0.479) 
0.006 
(0.465) 
0.008 
(0.29) 
0.007 
(0.392) 
0.004 
(0.595) 
0.010 
(0.297) 
0.002 
(0.699) 
0.002 
(0.768) 
Volatility  -0.136 
(0.007) 
-0.130 
(0.073) 
 
-0.157 
(0.004) 
-0.134 
(0.006) 
-0.167 
(0.001) 
-0.159 
(0.002) 
-0.145 
(0.005) 
-0.133 
(0.001) 
-0.134 
(0.000) 
Interaction 0.040 
(0.016) 
 
0.042 
(0.084) 
0.039 
(0.014) 
0.041 
(0.023) 
0.058 
(0.001) 
-0.158 
(0.005) 
0.048 
(0.008) 
0.032 
(0.003) 
0.034 
(0.000) 
Investment 0.002 
(0.125) 
0.001 
(0.114) 
0.002 
(0.234) 
0.002 
(0.026) 
0.002 
(0.149) 
0.002 
(0.035) 
0.002 
(0.008) 
0.002 
(0.010) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
Initial GDP 
per capita 
(ln) 
 
-0.005 
(0.291) 
 
-0.005 
(0.360) 
-0.004 
(0.434) 
-0.007 
(0.160) 
-0.005 
(0.215) 
-0.004 
(0.387) 
-0.008 
(0.106) 
-0.002 
(0.648) 
-0.003 
(0.353) 
Aid per 
capita 
-0.001 
(0.394) 
 
-0.001 
(0.166) 
-0.0001 
(0.839) 
0.0002 
(0.732) 
-0.0002 
(0.619) 
-0.0003 
(0.522) 
0.0001 
(0.728) 
-0.001 
(0.181) 
-0.001 
(0.053) 
Policy 3.074 
(0.000) 
2.183  
(0.001) 
3.165 
(0.007) 
4.113 
(0.000) 
3.653 
(0.000) 
3.048 
(0.000) 
3.996 
(0.000) 
1.430 
(0.005) 
1.724 
(0.004) 
 
Countries/N 
 
56/332 65/397 57/336 64/375 68/408 75/455 64/382 77/434 77/439 
Endogenou
s variables 
used as 
instruments 
Institutional 
quality, 
Interaction, 
policy, aid, 
initial GDP, 
investment 
 
Institutional 
quality, 
Interaction, 
policy, aid, 
initial GDP, 
investment 
Institutional 
quality, 
Interaction, 
policy, aid, 
initial GDP, 
investment 
Institutional 
quality, 
Interaction, 
policy, aid, 
initial GDP, 
investment 
Institutional 
quality, 
Interaction, 
policy, aid, 
initial GDP, 
investment 
Institutional 
quality, 
Interaction, 
policy, aid, 
initial GDP, 
investment 
Institutional 
quality, 
Interaction, 
policy, aid, 
initial GDP, 
investment 
Institutional 
quality, 
Interaction, 
policy, aid, 
initial GDP, 
investment 
Institutional 
quality, 
Interaction, 
policy, aid, 
initial GDP, 
investment 
No. of lags 
of 
endogenous 
variables 
used in 
instrumenta
tion 
 
Two Two Two Two Two Two Two Two Three 
AR(1) test 
(p-value) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0. 000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) test 
(p-value) 
0.353 0.147 0.831 0.577 0.693 0.303 
 
0.705 0.621 0.465 
Hansen J-
statistic 
0.824 0.538 0.780 0.431 0.490 0.855 0.309 0.371 0.808 
          
          
          
***, **, 
and 
*
 indicate significance level at 1%, 5%  and 10% respectively, against a two-sided alternative. Figures in parentheses are p-values. 
All regressions except those in column (1) and (2) are carried out without an intercept. Constant terms, country and time dummies not 
reported. 
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Variable Definition Source 
Democratic accountability 
 
 
 
 
Political Rights 
 
 
Institutional Quality 
 
Ordinal data measured on a scale between 1 and 7. low 
accountability is represented by a number at the lower end 
of the scale; conversely, high accountability is indicated 
by a number at the higher end of the scale. 
 
Ordinal data measured on a scale between 1 and 7; Higher 
numbers on the scale represent weaker political rights 
 
Equal weighted average of Democratic accountability and 
Political rights 
 
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG)
12
 
 
 
 
Freedom House 
GDP per capita growth rate 
 
Annualized average growth rate of GDP per capita  World Bank, WDI 
Initial GDP per capita (log) 
 
GDP per capita in constant 2000 USD for the first year of 
each period  
World Bank, WDI 
Investment 
 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation (%) in constant 2000  World Bank, WDI 
Volatility Volatility of foreign aid for each period Authors’ calculations 
Vari
able 
Desc
ripti
on 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Volatility ( 7  ) 
 
 
Volatility ( 30  ) 
 
 
Volatility ( 75  ) 
 
 
Volatility ( 100  ) 
 
 
Policy Index 
 
 
Volatility of foreign aid for each period obtained for a 
smoothing parameter of 7 
  
Volatility of foreign aid for each period obtained for a 
smoothing parameter of 30 
 
Volatility of foreign aid for each period obtained for a 
smoothing parameter of 75 
 
Volatility of foreign aid for each period obtained for a 
smoothing parameter of 100 
 
Composite index of M2/GDP and log inflation, where 
M2/GDP is defined as Money and quasi money (% of 
GDP in current USD) and log inflation is defined as 
Natural logarithm of 1+consumer price inflation 
  
 
Authors’ calculations 
 
 
Authors’ calculations 
 
 
Authors’ calculations 
 
 
 
Authors’ calculations 
 
Authors calculations 
Aid per capita 
 
Official Development Assistance OECD, DAC (online) 
Life expectancy (log) 
 
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) World Bank, WDI 
Interaction Product of volatility and Institutional Quality each period 
 
Authors’ calculations 
Fertility  Fertility rate, total (births per woman) World Bank, WDI 
   
Geography Area in tropics (km squared) World Bank, Global 
Development Network 
Population Total 
 
World Bank, WDI 
Trade share 
 
Ratio of international trade to GDP in constant 2000 USD 
 
Penn World Tables 
Schooling School enrollment, secondary (% gross) 
 
World Bank, WDI 
Ethnic Fractionalization 
 
Degree of ethnic, linguistic and religious heterogeneity 
 
Alesina et.al (2003) 
Real openness  
 
 
 
Budget Balance 
 
Mortality 
Nominal trade divided by PPP GDP 
 
 
 
The ratio of general government budget balance to GDP 
 
Log of estimated mortality for European settlers during 
the early period of European colonization (before 
1850); 
Alcalá and Ciccone 
(2001)/using Penn World 
Tables 
 
WDI 
 
Acemoglu et al. (2001), 
based on Curtin (1989) and 
other sources 
   
   
   
   
   
   
